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Abstract 
 
One of the suggested explanations for the UK productivity puzzle is that, since the onset of 
the Great Recession, low productivity plants that would normally have closed have continued 
operating. This paper therefore investigates whether there has been a change in the 
relationship between productivity and closure since the recession. We find that, for a number 
of sectors, the negative association between TFP and closure that existed prior to the 
recession has been offset, or even reversed, since the recession. 
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Highlights 
 
 This paper investigates plant closure in the UK since the Great Recession 
 There has been an exogenous fall in plant closure probability since 2008 
 Prior to 2008, TFP was negatively related to closure in almost all sectors 
 Since 2008, this association has been weakened or offset entirely in some sectors 
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1. Introduction 
 
Output-per-worker in the United Kingdom (UK) remained below its 2007 level until 2014 
and was, in the second quarter of 2015, over 11 per cent lower than if the pre-2008 trend had 
continued (ONS, 2015). This performance is unusual in the context of UK economic history 
since output-per-worker quickly recovered following earlier recessions (see Figure 4 in 
Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2014). Given the importance of productivity to long-run growth, it is 
unsurprising that this has been the subject of research, such that various explanations have 
now been put forward for the UK's productivity puzzle (e.g. Blundell et al., 2014; Disney et 
al., 2013; Goodridge et al., 2013; McCafferty, 2014; Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2014; Sargent, 
2013). One explanation is that the process by which resources are reallocated from low to 
high productivity firms, particularly through the opening (closure) of more (less) productive 
enterprises, has been impeded by the financial crisis (Broadbent, 2012). Such reallocations of 
resources have been shown to be crucial using productivity growth decompositions (Disney 
et al., 2003; Harris and Moffat, 2013), and to have played a role in reducing productivity 
growth since the recession both in the UK (Barnett et al., 2014) and the United States (Foster 
et al., 2014). A decrease in the rate of reallocations since the recession may be caused by 
reluctance on behalf of banks both to lend to new firms and to stop lending to companies 
already in difficulty since this would entail recognising losses on their books. The latter has 
supposedly led to the existence of 'zombie' firms (Caballero et al, 2008) that, in normal 
economic circumstances, would have closed. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we use plant-level data from the Annual Business Survey 
(ABS, formerly the Annual Respondents' Database) to estimate Cox proportional hazard 
models to identify whether there has been a change in the relationship between total factor 
productivity (TFP) and closure since the financial crisis. The next section describes the data 
and econometric model. The third section describes the results and the final section 
concludes. 
 
2. Data and Econometric Model 
 
The data covers 2002-2012 (although the final year cannot be used due to the impossibility of 
identifying plant closures) and most variables are taken from the longitudinal micro-level 
ARD/ABS database which has been discussed extensively elsewhere (Harris, 2005; 
Robjohns, 2006). Data on R&D, from the Business Enterprise Research and Development 
(BERD) dataset, and on outward foreign direct investment (FDI), from the Annual Foreign 
Direct Investment (AFDI) survey, are merged into the ARD/ABI database. 
 
The estimated model is: 
   ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥(𝑡)𝛽)      (1) 
where ℎ(𝑡)is the probability of closure in year 𝑡, having survived until year 𝑡, ℎ0(𝑡) is a non-
parametric baseline hazard function that is shared by all plants and 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥(𝑡)𝛽) is a 
parametric function of time-varying plant characteristics. The specification of the latter is: 
   𝑥(𝑡)𝛽 = 𝛽𝑅𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅×𝑇𝐹𝑃(𝑅𝑡 × 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑅𝑡 is a ‘recession’ dummy variable that takes the value of one from 2008 onwards; 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 is an index of TFP derived using the methodology set out in Harris and Moffat (2015)
1
; 
                                                 
1
 Unlike in Foster et al. (2014), TFP is not detrended with respect to industry and time since detrending would 
mean the results provided less information on why the UK’s aggregate productivity performance. For example, 
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and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of variables likely to determine the probability of closure (see Table 1). 
The hazard model is stratified on employment, the relative size of the plant in the firm and 
the relative size of the firm in the industry; stratification was necessary in order to satisfy the 
proportional hazard assumption of the Cox model. 
 
Table 1: Variables Descriptions and (weighted) mean values 
Variable Description Mean 
2002-2007 
Mean  
2008-2011 
Source 
TFP 
Plant total factor productivity 
constructed using methods described 
in Harris and Moffat (2015) 
0.332 0.350 ABS 
FDI 
Dummy coded 1 if plant is foreign-
owned 
0.456 0.686 ABS 
Outward FDI 
Dummy coded 1 if plant belongs to a 
UK firm involved in outward FDI 
0.160 0.246 AFDI 
R&D 
Dummy coded 1 if plant belongs to a 
firm involved in R&D 
0.021 0.025 BERD 
City 
Dummy coded 1 if plant is located in a 
major city 
0.230 0.253 ABS 
ln Capital-labour 
ratio 
Plant and machinery capital stock plus 
plant and machinery hires (Harris and 
Drinkwater, 2000, updated) divided by 
employment. 
-5.123 -4.964 ABS 
Age 
Number of years plant has been in 
operation 
8.996 10.207 ABS 
ln Employment Number of employees in plant 2.390 2.289 ABS 
Relative plant 
size 
Employment of plant divided by 
employment of firm 
0.301 0.229 ABS 
Relative 
employment 
size 
Employment of firm divided by 
employment of industry 0.032 0.040 ABS 
Region 
Dummies coded 1 if plant is located in 
one of 11 government office regions 
n/a n/a ABS 
 
The statistical significance of 𝛽𝑅×𝑇𝐹𝑃 will show whether there has been a change in the 
relationship between TFP and closure since the recession and therefore whether changes in 
the determinants of closure have had an effect on aggregate TFP. The model is estimated for 
12 sectors to allow for different relationships between the explanatory variables and closure 
across sectors (Table U.1 in the online appendix sets out the composition of these sectors). 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
if the relationship between (not detrended) TFP and closure is positive, it is clear that this would reduce 
aggregate TFP. By contrast, if the relationship between detrended TFP and closure is positive, that would not 
necessarily lower aggregate TFP since plants with high TFP (relative to the industry) may have low TFP 
(relative to all plants). Nevertheless, Table U.5 in the unpublished appendix shows that detrending makes little 
difference to the results obtained. 
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Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Function Estimates 
 
 
3. Results 
 
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates in Figure 1 show that the survival probability of plants 
was higher in both manufacturing and services after the recession. However, such 
comparisons fail to take account of differences in the characteristics of plants in 2002-2007 
and 2008-2011.
2
 The results in Table 2 from estimating equation (1) show that, when these 
are taken into account, there has indeed been an exogenous fall in the probability of closure 
post-2008 in all sectors apart from retailing. 
 
The evidence on the relationship between TFP and closure is mixed. In services, before the 
recession, the results show that there was a negative relationship between TFP and closure 
probability in all sectors before the recession. But post-2008, the relationship is mitigated or 
completely offset in six of the eight sectors considered (the exceptions are other low KI 
services and retail; the effect is not significant in sale of motor vehicles or hotels and 
restaurants). Thus in most service sectors, not only was there an exogenous reduction in the 
probability of closure (?̂?𝑅 < 0), the tendency of unproductive plants to close has also 
diminished (?̂?𝑅×𝑇𝐹𝑃 > 0). 
                                                 
2
 The full set of results are reported in Tables U.2-U.4 in the online appendix 
(https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/72592486/Online%20Appendix%20EL.pdf); Table 2 only reports the 
parameter estimates for ?̂?𝑅 , ?̂?𝑇𝐹𝑃 and ?̂?𝑅×𝑇𝐹𝑃.  
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Table 2 Parameter Estimates
a
 of Cox proportional Hazard Model
b
, 2002-2011 
 Manufacturing 
 
High-Tech 
Medium High-
Tech 
Medium Low-
Tech 
Low-Tech 
ln TFP 
0.246 -0.146 0.304* -0.414*** 
(0.218) (0.156) (0.167) (0.090) 
ln TFP 2008-11 
-0.105 0.397 0.077 1.199*** 
(0.340) (0.268) (0.284) (0.188) 
Year 2008-11 
-0.468** -0.681*** -0.753*** -0.933*** 
(0.227) (0.149) (0.144) (0.080) 
 
    
Observations 4,539 15,107 22,757 43,109 
Log likelihood -12,644 -30,466 -28,353 -67,805 
PH test p-value
c 
0.372 0.192 0.187 0.125 
 Services 
 
High-Tech 
Knowledge 
Intensive (KI) 
Knowledge 
Intensive 
Low KI Other Low KI 
ln TFP 
-0.493*** -1.846*** -1.135*** -0.835*** 
(0.151) (0.227) (0.140) (0.195) 
ln TFP 2008-11 
0.991*** 0.830*** 1.082*** -0.781*** 
(0.302) (0.265) (0.125) (0.283) 
Year 2008-11 
-0.745*** -0.266** -0.594*** -0.673*** 
(0.170) (0.119) (0.081) (0.069) 
 
    
Observations 19,795 34,556 205,350 102,297 
Log likelihood -28,643 -27,393 -195,023 -60,179 
PH test p-value 0.633 0.311 0.164 0.147 
 
Sale of Motor 
Vehicles (SIC50) 
Wholesale 
(SIC51) 
Retail (SIC52) 
Hotels & 
Restaurants 
(SIC55) 
ln TFP 
-0.818*** -0.449*** -1.869*** -3.930*** 
(0.213) (0.098) (0.140) (0.369) 
ln TFP 2008-11 
1.198 1.079*** -0.138 0.534 
(0.877) (0.206) (0.192) (0.507) 
Year 2008-11 
-0.433*** -1.609*** 0.045 -0.661** 
(0.047) (0.072) (0.108) (0.288) 
 
    
Observations 64,367 136,546 492,947 153,776 
Log likelihood -34,307 -109,563 -297,337 -56,334 
PH test p-value 0.240 0.068 0.000 0.723 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***/**/* denote statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels 
a
 The full range of parameter estimates are reported in Tables U.2 – U.4 in the online appendix. 
b 
Stratified on age, employment, relative employment size and relative plant size. 
c
 Test statistic for proportional hazards assumption on the basis of Schoenfeld residuals (phtest in STATA) 
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In manufacturing, the effect of TFP on closure is not statistically significant either before or 
after the recession in high-tech or medium high-tech manufacturing. In low-tech 
manufacturing, the picture is the same as that observed in most service sectors: the negative 
association of TFP and closure observed prior to the recession is offset by a strong positive 
effect of TFP on closure after the recession. Surprisingly, in medium low-tech manufacturing, 
more productivity plants are more like to exit in both periods. 
 
Since large diversified enterprises may be able to protect unproductive plants from closure,
3
 
the model is re-estimated using two samples: the 'diversified' sample includes plants 
belonging to firms that are part of a larger enterprise group, foreign-owned plants and plants 
belonging to firms involved in outward FDI; the 'undiversified' sample includes UK-owned 
plants that belong to firms not owned by a larger enterprise group or involved in outward 
FDI. While there is little difference in the (mostly negative) relationship between TFP and 
closure prior to the recession across the two groups, the 'diversified group' experienced a 
smaller offsetting change in the relationship after the recession, particularly in services. This 
provides indicative evidence that the diversified group may be less dependent upon, for 
example, bank financing and therefore have been less affected by changes in bank behaviour 
since the recession. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to identify whether there has been a change in the probability of 
closure and in the relationship between TFP and closure in Britain since the Great Recession. 
The results show that, conditional on plant characteristics, there has been an exogenous 
decrease in the probability of closure since the Great Recession. Moreover, there is evidence 
for some sectors, particularly in services, that the negative relationship between TFP and 
closure that prevailed prior to 2008, was offset, or even entirely reversed after this date. This 
suggests that changes in the determinants of closure have indeed played a role in the UK’s 
productivity puzzle. 
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